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NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS IN THE REFLECTED LIGHT OF THE
DAVIS AND LESTER CASES
JOSEPH N. DUCANTO*
INTRODUCTION
URING THE early 1960's the United States Supreme Court ren-
dered two decisions which have had a profound impact upon
the negotiation and drafting of marital settlement agreements:
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), and Commissioner v.
Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961). Despite the fact that the Davis case
has been with us for seven years, and the Lester case for eight years,
there has been surprisingly little effort made in the legal literature
to analyze these cases and to relate them directly to the areas upon
which they most directly impinge-the negotiation and drafting of
property settlement agreements.
It is not enough for matrimonial experts, and others who only oc-
casionally enter this field, to know the "black letter" law set forth in
these cases. The true "expert" must immerse himself in them. He
must acquire an understanding of the implications of these cases and
their application to concrete problems. With this knowledge his re-
sponse to related problems met in face to face negotiations will often
appear to be instantaneous. Thus, even though he may frequently be
under intense pressure, he can clearly follow the contour lines of these
cases without posing insuperable adverse problems or results for either
party.
It is my purpose in this article to analyze the aforementioned cases
in detail in an attempt to give some practical insight into the applica-
tion of the principles underlying them. The conclusions reached
* MR. DUCANTO received his B.A. from Antioch College and his J.D. from
the University of Chicago. He is a member of the Illinois Bar and is a partner in
the Chicago firm of Bentley, Campbell, DuCanto & Silvestri. MR. DUCANTO is cur-
rently Visiting Lecturer at Loyola University School of Law. This article was
originally prepared as an address which was made before the American Academy
of Matrimonial Lawyers at the Association of the Bar, City of New York, in Novem-
ber of 1969.
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shall be most particularly directed to the many common factual prob-
lems encountered in settlement negotiations and drafting of agree-
ments incident to divorce and separation matters.
THE Davis CASE'
Here the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
the decision of the Court of Claims reversing the determination of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue regarding taxation of certain
transfers made by a husband to his wife in connection with a marital
settlement agreement. Mr. Davis had agreed to transfer to his wife
one thousand shares of stock in the DuPont Company, "in full set-
tlement and satisfaction of any and all claims and rights against the
husband whatsoever (including, but not by way of limitation, dower
and all rights under the laws of testacy and intestacy). . . ." The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue had determined that the transfer
was a "taxable event," but the Court of Claims reversed, basing its
conclusion upon previous case law from various Circuit Courts of
Appeals. These courts held that the husband's gain realized thereby
could not be determined because of the impossibility of evaluating
the fair market value of a release of the wife's marital rights.
The Court crosses the threshold question and determines that, in
fact, a transfer of property by one spouse to the other in discharge of
marital rights is a taxable event. The Court summarily rejected any
notion that the transaction here really partook of a division of prop-
erty by co-owners, carefully pointing out that the shares being trans-
ferred by Mr. Davis were his personal property and that, in fact, under
Delaware law (the local law under which the legal effect of the agree-
ment must be judged) the wife's rights in and to such property related
only to her indefeasible interest in her husband's estate. Under the
divorce laws of Delaware, the Court further pointed out, a court has
the right to order financial transactions and transfers on a "reason-
able" basis, but that, essentially, Delaware placed a burden of support
only on the husband's property, as opposed to making the wife a part
owner thereof as in many community property jurisdictions.
The Court next turned its attention to the problem of evaluation
of the release of marital rights and held, in effect, that the taxable
1. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
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gain realized upon such a transaction can and will be measured as
though the parties were dealing at arm's length, and that the value of
the marital rights released will be calculated at the same value as
the property transferred in order to obtain the release. 2  Further-
more, the Court pointed out that failure to fix the basis of the
property transferred to the wife at the value as of the date of transfer
would pose insuperable evaluation problems for her later, when she
sought to dispose of the property.'
One of the equally important aspects of Davis is the clear, unam-
biguous rejection by the Court of the argument that property trans-
ferred by a husband to his wife in marital settlement agreements nec-
essarily constitutes a "gift." 4 Instead the Court decided that for fed-
2. "It must be assumed, we think, that the parties acted at arm's length and
that they judged the marital rights to be equal in value to the property for which
they were exchanged. There was no evidence to the contrary here. Absent a
readily ascertainable value it is accepted practice where property is exchanged to
hold, as did the Court of Claims in Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United
States, 126 Fed. Supp. 184, 189 (1954), that the values of the two properties ex-
changed in an arm's-length transaction are either equal in fact, or are presumed to
be equal. . . . To be sure, there is much to be said of the argument that such an
assumption is weakened by the emotion, tension and practical necessities involved
in divorce negotiations and the property settlements arising therefrom. However,
once it is recognized that the transfer was a taxable event, it is more consistent with
the genneral purpose and scheme of taxing statutes to make a rough approximation
of the gain realized thereby than to ignore altogether its tax consequences. Cf.
Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56, 67 (1942)." Id. at 72-73.
3. "Moreover, if the transaction is to be considered a taxable event as to the
husband, the Court of Claims' position (which disclaimed any ability to evaluate re-
lease of marital obligations by a spouse) leaves up in the air the wife's basis for
the property received. In the context of a taxable transfer by the husband, all in-
dicia point to a 'cost' basis for this property in the hands of the wife. Yet under the
Court of Claims position, her cost for this property, i.e., the value of the marital
right relinquished therefore, would be indeterminable, and on subsequent disposition
of the property she might suffer inordinately over the Commissioner's assessment
which she would have the burden of proving erroneous, Commissioner v. Hansen,
360 U.S. 446, 468 (1959). Our present holding that the value of these rights is as-
certainable eliminates this problem; for the same calculation that determines the
amount received by the husband fixes the amount given up by the wife, and this
figure, i.e., the market value of the property transferred by the husband, will be
taken by her as her tax basis for the property received." Supra note 1, at 73.
4. "Any suggestion that the transaction in question was a gift is completely
unrealistic. Property transferred pursuant to a negotiated settlement in return
for the release of admittedly valuable rights is not a gift in any sense of the term.
To intimate that there was a gift to the extent the value of the property exceeded
that of the rights released not only invokes the erroneous premise that every ex-
change not precisely equal involves a gift but merely raises the measurement prob-
lems discussed, infra., p. 71. Cases in which this Court had held transfers of prop-
erty in exchange for the release of marital rights subject to gift taxes are based not on
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eral income tax purposes such a transfer will not be considered a gift,
even though it would otherwise be so classed under the gift tax stat-
utes, but for the fact of a divorce.5
Initially, the Davis case seems direct and clear, and, as "black let-
ter law," would read as follows:
The husband's transfer of property to his wife in settlement of his obligation to sup-
port her, as a lump sum alimony payment, or for her release of her rights to his estate,
is a taxable disposition of the property in a common-law jurisdiction where the
inchoate rights of a wife do not constitute co-ownership. In a community-property
state or where the wife does have co-ownership interest in the property, there may be
non-taxable disposition of property. The gain to the husband on a taxable disposition
is the excess of the value of the rights released by the wife over his basis for the trans-
ferred property.0
However, the basic defect of "black letter law" is that it often raises
more questions than it answers. For example, is Davis applicable in
situations where a husband transfers solely-owned appreciated prop-
erty to his wife and there is not a corresponding release by her of her
right to support in connection with a divorce? My conclusion is that
Davis would apply. The concept of a "taxable event" does not
hinge upon a precise weighing or evaluation of the consideration re-
ceived by the husband as a result of the transfer.7 Additionally, in
these situations the wife generally releases her inchoate rights in and
to the husband's estate (even though the legal effect of a decree
would presumably bar these rights) by means of the substitution
of other benefits she will receive during the husband's lifetime, or
from his estate. We must also recognize that the amount of current
support agreed upon by the parties is in large measure determined
with reference to the size and amounts of the current transfers from
the husband to his wife within the property settlement agreement.
Hence, it would clearly appear to make no difference as to the taxable
the premise that such transactions are inherently gifts but on the concept that in the
contemplation of the gift tax statute they are to be taxed as gifts. Merrill v. Fahs,
324 U.S. 308 (1945); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945); see Harris v.
Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950). In interpreting the particular income tax pro-
visions here involved, we find ourselves unfettered by the language and considera-
tions engrained in the Gift and Estate Tax Statutes. See Farid-Es_.Sultaneh v.
Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947)." Supra note 1, at 69 n.6.
5. See Hundley v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 495 (1969), for a recent application
of this principle, and Rev. Rul. 68-379, replacing ET 19.
6. P-H 1967 FED. TAXES 31, 111.
7. Solomon, Property Transfer Pursuant to Divorce-Taxable Event? 17 STAN-
FORD L. REV. 478 (1965).
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character of the exchange whether the wife released all, part, or none
of her current right to support."
In the Davis case we clearly see establishment of two categories of
transfers from husband to wife: 1) a transfer of his solely-owned
property in release or relinquishment of marital rights, clearly a tax-
able transaction; and 2) a division of property by co-owners which
may or may not constitute a taxable event. It is the second category
of transfers to which I shall primarily direct my discussion, since it
is this area which is pervaded by the greatest uncertainty of under-
standing and of result.
WHAT CONSTITUTES A DIVISION OF JOINTLY OWNED PROPERTIES
UNDER THE Davis CASE?
It is traditional-and indeed institutionalized in large measure in
community property states-that husband and wife will, over sub-
stantial years of coverture, acquire much property which is held in
joint tenancy. In the overwhelming percentage of cases it is ex-
clusively the husband's income which produces the accumulation of
wealth in terms of joint bank accounts, checking accounts, jointly
owned securities and the marital home. It is equally true that no
consideration is given to the gift tax aspects when these joint tenancy
arrangements are created. In the majority of these cases the regis-
tration of assets in joint names can be characterized as being for the
convenience of husband and wife. Such "convenience" extends to
the certainty of devolution of these assets to the surviving spouse
without the intervention of probate proceedings and the ability of
either spouse to attend to alienation or sale of these assets as the agent
of the other co-owner spouse. Furthermore, no one should under-
estimate the powerful forces of resentment, suspicion, and strain
which are likely to be created in a marriage by virtue of a husband's
attempt not to follow this traditional pattern; one may explain the
adverse gift and estate tax consequences of the creation of joint
tenancy arrangements to a wife and still not allay her suspicion that
registration of assets in her husband's name is meant solely to defeat
any possible later claim she may have to such assets.
8. See also text at 15, and discussion of Pulliam v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 97
(10th Cir. 1964).
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Notwithstanding absence of recognition or intention on the part
of the husband to make a gift of one-half of these assets to his wife,
such is often the case for gift tax purposes so far as jointly held se-
curities are concerned. 9 Additionally, a gift is completed as to bank
and checking accounts when the non-contributing spouse actually
withdraws or utilizes the funds for her own, non-family-connected,
purposes.10 Registration of real estate purchased subsequent to Jan-
uary 1, 1955 in joint tenancy between husband and wife does not re-
sult in a gift of an interest to the non-contributing spouse for gift tax
purposes, unless the spouse furnishing the consideration elected to
have the transaction treated as a gift and timely files a federal gift
tax return." In regard to real estate, the transfer is completed upon
death of the purchasing spouse, at which point the survivor has sole
legal title. The entire net market value of the real estate is not
treated as a "gift" but, in lieu thereof, is fully included in the estate of
the decedent for federal estate tax purposes. A gift is also com-
pleted when the real estate is sold or otherwise disposed of and the
wife receives any portion of the proceeds in excess of the proportion
which she originally contributed to its purchase. It is irrelevant for
purposes of this analysis that under local law a wife may be treated
as actually "owning" a one-half interest for all legal purposes, in-
cluding payment of local inheritance taxes.' 2
The liability for and payment of gift taxes, and indeed the recog-
nition of any legal duty to do so, is substantially muted and of little
practical effect because of the relatively large annual inter-spouse ex-
emption from the gift tax which normally applies because of the op-
eration of the marital deduction to such gifts.' 3 For example, a hus-
band may make a gift of up to $6,000 annually to his wife without
any gift tax liability, because one-half of the gift, $3,000, is excluded
from computation by use of the marital deduction and the other one-
half, or another $3,000, is exempt by use of the husband's annual
9. Treas. Reg. 25.2511-1(h)(5) (1970).
10. Treas. Reg. 25.2511-1(h)(4) (1970).
11. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2515; Treas. Reg. 25.2523 (1970).
12. In Illinois, for inheritance tax purposes, a surviving joint tenant is taxable
only on one-half the value of joint tenancy properties. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 120,
§ 375(5) (1969).
13. Treas. Reg. 25.2523 (1970).
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gift tax exclusion." This annual amount can be augmented by
utilization of the husband's specific lifetime exemption of $30,000,
to permit him to transfer into joint tenancy as much as $66,000
in a single year without any gift tax liability, although in this case a
gift tax return is required."
Thus, in any taxable year a husband who saves less than $12,000
by means of original purchases of securities or other property in joint
tenancy has no gift tax liability even though he is technically re-
quired to file a return when claiming the marital deduction.'6 Most
importantly, however, he achieves no awareness that he has in fact
made an effective gift.
It is against the foregoing backdrop that we ought now to apply
the Davis case to specific factual situations.
(1) Over the 20 years of their marriage, husband and wife have accumulated securities
valued at $150,000 held in joint tenancy, such securities having a cost basis of
$50,000 in their hands. As a part of a property settlement agreement the securities
are evenly divided between the parties.
Tax Result: No taxable event. Wife's securities in her hands valued at $75,000
and have a basis of $25,000, with the same result for husband.
(2) Same facts as (1), but husband transfers all securities to wife and receives a release
of her support, dower and inheritance rights in husband's estate.
Tax Result: Husband has incurred, and must pay tax on, a capital gain of $50,000;
wife's basis in the securities transferred to her now amounts to $100,000, $25,000 at-
tributable to her own basis in one-half the securities and $75,000, the appreciated
value of her husband's share of the securities transferred to her.
(3) Same facts as (1), but wile releases her joint tenancy interests to husband; hus-
band agrees to pay wife $200,000-$50,000 immediately and $150,000 in monthly in-
stallments over 150 months, and wife releases all her marital rights.
Tax Result: Wife has incurred, and must pay tax on, a capital gain of $50,000.
Husband's basis in the securities is now stepped up to $100,000. The $50,000 im-
mediate payment to wife is not deductible by husband and is not taxable per se
to wife, although the $150,000 payable in monthly installments qualifies as "peri-
odic,"'1 7 hence taxable to wife and deductible by husband.
(4) In 1956 husband purchased a marital home costing $50,000, with a mortgage of
$35,000, providing $15,000 by means of sale of securities solely owned by him prior
to marriage, placing title in joint tenancy with wife. No election was filed by hus-
band treating the transaction as a gift. In 1969, the home then having a fair market
value of $100,000, husband transfers the home to wife in connection with a marital
14. Treas. Reg. 25.2503-1 (1970).
15. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2513; Treas. Reg. 25.2513-1 (1970).
16. Treas. Reg. 25.6019-1 (1970).
17. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 71(c)(2).
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settlement agreement, subject to the original mortgage which has been reduced to
$15,000, which wife agrees to assume.
Tax Result: Husband has incurred, and must pay tax on, a capital gain of $35,000
(fair market value less the original basis of $50,000 and less the outstanding mort-
gage assumed by wife). Wife's basis in the property is $100,000, the fair market
value of the home at the date of transfer.
(5) Same facts as (4), but house is sold following the divorce and the resulting net
proceeds after payment of mortgage balance ($85,000) is evenly divided between
husband and wife.
Tax Result: Husband has incurred, and must pay tax on, a capital gain of $35,000,
as in (4). The $42,500 paid to wife, but for the decree of divorce, would have con-
stituted a completed "gift" under Section 2515 at the time the one-half proceeds were
delivered to wife. Section 2516, however, exempts the transaction from imposition of
the gift tax, but the Davis rule nonetheless fully applies.
(6) Same facts as (4), but $15,000 down payment for house came from liquidation
of jointly held securities and home is taken in joint tenancy.
Tax Result: Husband has incurred, and must pay tax on, a capital gain of $17,500
(one-half of fair market value [$50,000] less one-half of his original basis [$25,000],
less one-half of the existing mortgage [$7,500] = $17,500 capital gain). Wife's basis
is, however, not increased to $100,000, the full fair market value of the house, but to
$75,000, the sum of her original basis of $25,000, plus the $50,000 basis of her
husband's received as a result of the transfer.
(7) Husband and wife own in joint tenancy the following property acquired since
1956: (a) stocks with a basis of $50,000 having a fair market value of $200,000;
(b) real property with a basis of $50,000 and a fair market value of $100,000. A
property settlement agreement is executed which provides as follows:
Husband Receives:
The stock, valued at $200,000 with a basis of $50,000.
Wile Receives:
The real estate, valued at $100,000 with a basis of $50,000, plus $50,000 cash from
husband.
Tax Result: Wife has incurred, and must pay tax on, a capital gain of $75,000, since
she has "sold" her one-half interest in the stock valued at $100,000 for $50,000 in
cash, plus $50,000 received by way of husband's release and transfer of his one-half
interest in the real estate to wife. Wife's basis in the real estate is increased to $75,000.
Husband, too, has incurred, and must pay tax on, a capital gain of $25,000, since he
"sold" his one-half of the real estate valued at $50,000 to wife which has a basis of
$25,000. Husband's basis in the stock retained by him has, however, been increased\
to $125,000, his original basis of $25,000, plus $50,000 in cash and $50,000 in the
form of real estate paid to wife.
AVOIDANCE OF LATER CAPITAL GAINS
TAX PROBLEMS FOR CLIENTS
All of the foregoing strongly suggests that practitioners in this area
seriously attend to and be cognizant of the basic tax ramifications
produced by these types of transfers. To do otherwise can only lead
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to serious and annoying problems, often many years after the trans-
actions have occurred and the divorce has been finalized. For
example, a wife disposes of the real estate some years following the
divorce. Is she aware of what her tax basis is? Does the husband
know that he has to pay a capital gains tax, and did he do so in the
taxable year in which the transfer was completed?
Many of these types of problems arise and plague the client long
after he has terminated his contact and relation with his "divorce at-
torney." Such problems are often observed and rectified by the In-
ternal Revenue Service by assessment of deficiencies for unpaid taxes
and payment of appropriate penalties. A claimed deduction for ali-
mony paid during the taxable year is often sustained by proof of pay-
ment of the funds in the taxable year and by production of the decree
of divorce establishing the obligation. Accordingly, it is a simple
matter for the revenue agent to check the payment or non-payment of
capital gains taxes upon various transfers called for in the decree.
Minimally, the attorney's files should contain a current market ap-
praisal of property transferred from one spouse to the other in con-
nection with these arrangements. In addition a letter to the client out-
lining the net tax effect of his compliance with any agreement should
also be kept. To do less than this is to invite serious future problems
for the client and to open the door later, and perhaps justifiably, to
criticism of the attorney for failure to advise him of his duty to report
and pay taxes upon the transactions involved.
LOCAL LAW AS AFFECTING APPLICATION OF THE Davis RULE
I would now like to turn my attention to a number of recent cases
which demonstrate how application of the Davis rule can differ
greatly from state to state because of the range of variations as to how
local laws view the basic right of a wife in property acquired during
coverture. We all understand that in community property states,
such as California, local law generally treats all property acquired by
husband and wife during coverture (with specified exceptions, such
as inheritances), as community property, thereby subjecting it to
equitable division upon a dissolution of the community by way of di-
vorce. In these instances the Davis case does not intrude, if the com-
munity property is equally divided. The rule in Davis also applies
to common law states with reference to joint tenancies and tenancies
1970]
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by the entirety. Moving from here, however, there is a "gray" area
with extremely subtle shadings where the question of treating trans-
actions as a "division" versus a transfer, becomes a product of inter-
pretation of local law as applied on a case by case basis.
Initially, two cases from Oklahoma must be examined: Swanson
v. Wiseman"8 , and Collins v. Commissioner.' An Oklahoma stat-
tue confers jurisdiction to a court in divorce actions to make a divi-
sion of property between husband and wife, whether it is jointly
owned or in the name of either party thereto.20 Hence, in every
Oklahoma divorce action there are three classifications of property
rights as between husband and wife: 1) husband's separate prop-
erty; 2) wife's separate property; and 3) property acquired during
the marriage, whether held jointly or not.
In Swanson v. Wiseman, the court found that all property owned
by the parties had been acquired during the course of a lengthy mar-
riage through the joint industry of the parties and ordered that the
property be equally divided, irrespective of how legal title was held.
The husband, in compliance with this mandate, and apparently as an
aid in effectuating the court's order, transferred assets of a business
owned by him as a sole proprietor into a newly created corporation.
Immediately thereafter he divided equally the resulting stock between
himself and his wife. Ten years later the wife disposed of her stock
by sale and attempted to claim as her basis the fair market value of
the shares as of the date they were transferred to her by her hus-
band. Furthermore, she contended that the transfer of stock was a
transfer in satisfaction of her marital rights and that she became en-
titled to a new cost basis in the stock as of the date of transfer.
The Swanson court rejected the wife's argument, holding that
the divorce court had specifically concluded that she had a direct in-
terest in all marital property, irrespective of how it was held. There-
fore, the transfer to her under the terms of the decree was a "property
division" and, hence, her basis in the stock related back to the original
basis of the property transferred by her husband to the corporation
in exchange for its shares. The court's decision substantially in-
18. Swanson v. Wiseman, No. 8478 (F.T.C., Feb. 23, 1961).
19. 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968).
20. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1278 (1961).
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creased the capital gains tax payable by her upon disposition of the
shares.
In Collins v. Commissioner," decided in 1968, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals was called upon to further interpret the same Okla-
homa statute which was applied in the Swanson case. In this case the
husband brought to the marriage a modest amount of stock in a cor-
poration and, shortly after his marriage, received by inheritance a
substantial block of additional stock in the same company. Seven-
teen years later, at the time of the execution of a property settlement
with his wife, his original holdings had increased many times over.
The husband transferred a substantial block of the stock to his wife
in connection with the settlement agreement, which was later incor-
porated into a decree of divorce. However, the husband failed to
report the transfer or to pay a capital gains tax thereon. The Com-
missioner duly issued a notice of deficiency and this litigation resulted.
The husband strongly contended that under the Oklahoma statute
in question, conferring jurisdiction on the court to make a division
of property, the wife is given an express interest in husband's prop-
erty and the transfer of shares to his wife was in recognition and re-
lease of the wife's interest in his solely owned property.
The Collins court agreed, as contended by husband, that under
the Davis case it must look to the state law controlling disposition of
the property to determine the exact nature of the present disposition
for tax purposes. The court concluded that Mr. Collins was not
a party to a "property division" as interpreted under Oklahoma law,
because the statute in question did not vest any property right in the
wife to her husband's solely owned property prior to the divorce de-
cree. Her marital rights did not, therefore, resemble those of co-
ownership. Also, she had no descendable interest in the stock. Fi-
nally, she could not have prevented disposition of the stock by her
husband prior to the divorce, having no discernable claim to a fixed
percentage of the property. Instead the court decided that whatever
claim she had was subject to a judicial determination of what was
"just and reasonable," and that the determination depended upon fac-
tors other than her efforts during the marriage to enhance the value
of the property, e.g., her needs, her station in life, the cost of edu-
21. 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968).
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cating the children, etc.2
Pulliam v. Commissioner is another Tenth Circuit Court tax
case interpreting a Colorado divorce statute similar to that of Okla-
homa. However, in the Pulliam case there was no property settle-
ment agreement and the divorce court was called upon-and did-
decree a "division of property." The Pulliam court painstakingly
held that the absence of an "agreement" did not affect the application
of the Davis rule in transfers compelled by court order, nor did the
fact that the decree of divorce specifically failed to bar or release all
of the wife's marital rights affect application of the Davis rule. The
court further held that the decree alone served to bar the wife's
inchoate rights in the husband's estate, doing in the process no more
or less than would have been achieved by an express agreement waiv-
ing and releasing these rights.24
22. "In summation, it appears that the division of jointly acquired property
pursuant to a divorce decree in Oklahoma is in many instances in direct recognition
of the wife's right to a share in the property. 'This concept, however, is not
unique to Oklahoma and Kansas, as claimed by petitioner. Many states confer
the power upon divorce courts to transfer to the wife property of the husband. It
is true that no other state requires the division or so explicitly develops the concept.
Nonetheless, the same principle is recognized in other states (citing NELSON ON
DIVORCE, §§ 14.104 and 14.120). . . .' These rights, such as descendable interest,
right to control and disposition of property and vested interest, are set out in the
Supreme Court in United States v. Davis, supra, as factors that distinguish a
marital division in satisfaction of a legal obligation from a division between co-
owners. Since these traditional elements of co-ownership are lacking, the fact that in
making a decision the state courts speak as though they were dividing property
between co-owners does not prevent the Federal courts from saying that for tax pur-
poses the division was in satisfaction of a marital obligation and thus taxable."
Id. at 357.
23. 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1964).
24. ". . . The argument of the petitioner based on this difference is not dissimi-
lar to his involuntary transfer or lack of agreement argument. Here again all mat-
ters relating to the rights and interests of the parties in property or personal obli-
gations of the husband were covered by the decree or were implicit in the proceed-
ings. It would of course be expected that an express release would be included in a
property settlement agreement or at least a mention of such right. Likewise, when
the property allocation was submitted for the court's determination, its decree or
the legal consequences of its action would cover and include the same matters. The
divorce court's decree has completely disposed of the property issue, and the wife's
marital rights relating to that subject have been terminated. The property was
allocated and we are concerned here only with the value of such property trans-
ferred to the wife and to then apply the equal value theory. The divorce decree
transferred property to the wife to satisfy whatever rights she was asserting or
which were otherwise in issue. The parties asked the divorce court in effect to
settle the property matter." Id. at 99-100.
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Two related 1968 tax cases 25 arising under the divorce laws of
Kentucky explain how the application of local law can and does
seriously impinge upon and direct the federal income tax results. In
these cases, Mildred and Harry Swaim owned real estate in joint ten-
ancy which they sold on an installment basis, obviously looking to
spread the capital gain over several years rather than paying it all in
the year of actual sale. 26 Each of them received one-half of the initial
down payment and one-half of various notes representing the balance
due, payable at varying times over several years. In the wife's later di-
vorce action in Kentucky the court found that the husband had pro-
vided all of the money for purchase of the real estate. Therefore, un-
der Kentucky law, before the court could award the wife alimony, it
was required to order a conveyance and restoration to the husband of
his property, that is, the real estate owned in joint tenancy. Without
requiring an actual transfer, the court awarded to the wife as a part
of a lump sum payment in lieu of alimony, one of several of the in-
stallment notes originally delivered to her by the contract purchaser
at the time of sale in recognition of her joint tenancy interest in the
property. These two actions determined that, under the Davis case,
the husband alone was liable for and taxable upon the entire capital
gain flowing from the contract sale. Therefore, the wife's basis in the
installment note awarded her by the court was its value at the time of
its award to her-its face value, which she subsequently received-
and, hence, there was no taxable gain as to her.
"SPECIAL EQUITIES" UNDER LOCAL LAW
Implicit in several of these cases, particularly those from Okla-
homa, lurks the presence of some concept akin to what has become
known in Illinois as "special equities." Section 17 of our Divorce
Act, which is similar to many other states, provides as follows:
Whenever a divorce is granted, if it shall appear to the court that either party holds the
title to property equitably belonging to the other, the court may compel conveyance
thereof to be made to the party entitled to the same, upon such terms as it shall
deem equitable. 2 7
25. Swain v. Commissioner, 50 TC 336 (1968), and Swain v. Commis-
sioner, 50 TC 302 (1968).
26. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 453(b).
27. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 40, § 18 (1969).
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This provision has been in the Illinois law since 1874 and is but a re-
statement of a similar statute prevalent in the territory of Illinois prior
to 1818.2S A reliance on this section is predicated upon affirmative
pleading of facts which, if established by adequate proof, would en-
able the court to require a transfer of property from the opposite
spouse to the spouse not in title.2 It thus appears that such a finding
by the court, particularly where supported by ample testimony and
evidence appearing in the record, might well insulate a subsequent
transfer made pursuant to the court's decree and finding from im-
position of tax. This is warranted because presumably the court's
award and decree respecting a conveyance under Section 17 would
amount to a "division of property" the same as a straight splitting of
joint tenancy properties. Hence, it is quite relevant, in cases where
a plea of "special equities" can be asserted and properly documented,
to consider not entering into a property settlement agreement per se.
Instead, permitting the court to hear the testimony and evidence and
make the finding of "special equities" and, on the basis of such find-
ings, to order the appropriate transfers, should be considered.
CONCLUSION AS TO THE Davis CASE
A review of the Davis case and its application to varying factual
situations has amply demonstrated its disembodied presence in the
negotiation and drafting of all marital settlement agreements. The
fact that attorneys may not have heretofore been aware of this doctrine
is excusable since the complexities surrounding its application have
not before been treated in a manner comprehensible by any but the
most sophisticated of tax specialists.
Commissioner v. Lester3 0 AND THE DOCTRINE OF LUMPING ALIMONY
AND CHIID SUPPORT: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDITY
Since the onset of World War H and the resulting sizable increase
in the level and rates of federal income taxation brought about by the
war, there has been a clear trend towards extending "income splitting"
28. See also historical notes to § 18, ILL. STAT. ANN. Ch. 40, § 18 (1956).
29. Skoronski v. Skoronski, 395 II. 301, 302, 69 N.E.2d 690, 691 (1946); Ste-
vens v. Stevens, 14 I11. 2d 99, 108, 150 N.E.2d 799 (1958); see also WEINBERG,
ILLINOIS DIVORCE, SEPARATE MAINTENANCE AND ANNULMENT, (2nd ed. 1969).
30. 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
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advantages to litigants in divorce actions. Prior to 1942 alimony
payments were not clearly deductible by the payor. It was not until
1942 that an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code clearly
spelled out deductibility of alimony.3' Since that time the philosophy
of taxation of divorced spouses has changed. Presently the parties
in divorce actions can agree upon and set the income tax conse-
quences of support arrangements between themselves. The ability
to do so effectively and intelligently, however, is entirely dependent
upon familiarity and understanding of the basic tax rules and the
tax limitations placed upon formulation of these arrangements.
THE Lester CASE
In Lester v. Commissioner12 the taxpayer deducted in full sums
paid to his ex-wife in 1951 and 1952 under an agreement which
provided that the amount of periodic payments to the ex-wife would
be reduced by one-sixth upon a successive marriage, death, or eman-
cipation of each of three children of the marriage. The Commis-
sioner sued the father to recover a claimed deficiency in payment of
income taxes for those years, contending that, because of the reduc-
tions as the children became emancipated, the agreement "specifi-
cally designated" one-half of the periodic payments as child support.
Hence, as to that one-half, the taxpayer was not entitled to a deduc-
tion as in the case of "alimony" payments.
The United States Supreme Court held otherwise, interpreting the
1942 amendments to the Code to require an unequivocal "fixing"
of child support within the agreement before that sum could be ex-
cluded from the taxable income of the mother.
The agreement must expressly specify or 'fix' a sum certain or percentage of the pay-
ment for child support before any of the payment is excluded from the wife's income.
The statutory requirement is strict and carefully worded. It does not say that 'a suf-
ficiently clear purpose' on the part of the parties is sufficieint to shift the tax. It says
that the 'written instrument' must 'fix' that 'portion of the payment' which is to go
to the support of the children. Otherwise, the wife must pay the tax on the whole
payment. We are obliged to enforce this mandate of the Congress.
Thus we see the Lester case as the clear, unambiguous authority for
the "lumping" of child support and alimony into a unitary weekly,
monthly or yearly amount.
31. INT. REV. CODE of 1939, §§ 39.22(k)-i, 39.23(u)-I.
32. 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
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WHY LUMP AT ALL?
Since we exist under a steeply graduated income tax system, a
modest decrease in "taxable income" often produces a much more
dramatic percentage decrease in taxes payable. For example: a
single taxpayer pays $8,030 in taxes on $24,000 of taxable income
(excluding the surcharge and state income taxes), with an effective
tax rate of 50% on the last $2,000 block of taxable income. A sin-
gle taxpayer with $12,000 of taxable income pays $2,830 in taxes,
with an effective tax rate of 32% on the last $2,000 block of taxable
income. Therefore, a single taxpayer with $24,000 of taxable in-
come pays almost three times the amount of taxes which a single tax-
payer pays with $12,000 of taxable income. Thus, between $12,000
and $24,000 in taxable income the amount of taxes payable triples
while income inself only doubles.
Let us, then, look at a family earning $24,000 of taxable income,
which will soon be divided by divorce. By filing a Joint Return and
utilizing the "income splitting" privileges provided by the Internal
Revenue Code, the parties pay taxes of $5,660 on two $12,000 in-
comes, instead of $8,030 on a $24,000 taxable income basis, for a
net tax savings of $2,370. By "lumping" child support and ali-
mony, and dividing the taxable income-$12,000 to the father and
$12,000 to mother and the children-we can continue to achieve the
tax savings accorded to "income splitting" married couples filing a
joint return. Furthermore the mother will qualify to report her
$12,000 of taxable income as "head of household" because she will
be claiming the children as exemptions and will, in fact, be provid-
ing their full support out of "alimony" income received.8
These considerations impel the conclusion that the lumping of child
support and alimony will often produce the greatest net tax savings,
often leaving both the mother and father with more "disposable
income" than following the more traditional pattern of allocating a
sum certain for the children and an additional set sum as alimony.
The limitations inherent in this approach can be easily calculated
with reference to any given factual situation by simply charting out
the results achieved by means of utilizing varying assumptions as
to allocations between alimony and child support.




With the foregoing background in mind, let us now turn to a
typical Lester-type provision and examine its utility and deficien-
cies.
(1) Husband hereby agrees to pay Wife, as, and for, her support and that of the (two)
minor children (a girl 10 years and a boy 8 years of age), the sum of One Thousand
Dollars ($1,000) each and every month commencing the first day of the month fol-
lowing entry of a Decree of Divorce in said pending action and continuing from month
to month thereafter until further order of Court.
Tax Result: Husband has a deduction for $12,000 per year as "alimony;" wife must
report entire amount in her gross income, and she has exemptions for children and
may utilize "Head of Household tax table."
Deficiencies: Court action, or further negotiations, necessary on changes of circum-
stances, which can easily be anticipated, i.e., wife's remarriage, or emancipation of any
of children, change in husband's ability to pay, or needs of wife and children, etc.
It is because of these easily correctable deficiencies that use of the pre-
ceding example is quite limited. Thus, the following example, which
anticipates readily ascertainable changes, is usually preferable.
(2) Husband hereby agrees to pay wife, as, and, for her support and that of the two
minor children (a girl 10 years and a boy 8 years of age), the sum of One Thousand
Dollars ($1,000) each and every month commencing the First day of the month fol-
lowing entry of a Decree of Divorce in said pending action and continuing from
month to month thereafter until further order of Court; provided, however, that the
amount of such allowance, as now etablished or hereafter modified, shall be reduced
twenty-five per cent (25%) upon the death, marriage or legal emancipation of each
child and shall be further reduced an additional fifty per cent (50%) upon wife's
remarriage following a divorce.
Tax Reuslt: Identical to that of Example 1. Upon wife's remarriage, remaining por-
tion of payments (either 25% or 50%) still payable by father reverts to child support
payments, non-deductible by father, not includible in mother's income. 3 4
Deficiencies: Amounts payable still subject to modification upon changes in cir-
cumstances, but intended results following wife's remarriage and successive emanci-
pation of children clearly spelled out, thus avoiding future negotiations and possible
need for court action.
There are, of course, any number of variations of the above, relatively
simple, formulations which can be effectively employed in given in-
stances as, for example, the coupling of a Lester-type provision with
34. Upon wife's remarriage, unless the property settlement agreement pro-
vides otherwise, local law generally holds that the ex-husband's obligation to sup-
port the ex-wife terminates. Since there is no longer any legal duty to support the
ex-wife following a remarriage, any future payments made by the ex-husband under
the Lester-type provision herein set forth will be ascribed as being made in dis-
charge of his legal obligation to support his children. See Brown v. Commis-
sioner, 50 TC 865 (1968); Hoffman v. Commissioner, 54 TC - (1970).
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a lump sum settlement in lieu of property rights,"5 as illustrated by the
next example.
(3) (a) Husband hereby agrees to pay wife, as and for a lump sum settlement in lieu
of all property rights in and to husband's assets and estate, the sum of Sixty-Two
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($62,500), said sum to be payable in monthly
installments of Five Hundred Dollars ($500) for one hundred twenty-five (125)
months following date of entry of a decree of divorce in said pending action.
(b) In addition to the amounts hereinabove payable to wife in subparagraph (a),
husband hereby agrees to pay wife, as and for her support and that of the [two]
minor children the sum of Five Hundred Dollars ($500) per month commencing
the first day of the month following entry of a decree of divorce in said pending
action and continuing from month to month thereafter until further order of Court;
provided, however, that the amount of such allowance, as now established or here-
after modified, shall be reduced fifty per cent (50%) upon achievement of ma-
jority, emancipaton or death of each child.
Tax Result: Wife must include payments received under both (a) and (b) above in
her income as "periodic" payments received. The amounts received by her under (a)
still constitute "periodic" income-and hence continue to be taxable to her-follow-
ing her remarriage, whereas payments received under (b) following her remarriage
become non-taxable to her as "child support."' 3 6
Deficiencies: Amount of "child support" still subject to modification upon a change
of circumstances. Payments under (a) are unmodifiable by any court as constituting
a lump sum settlement which merges and becomes a judgment for the sum due.
There is, of course, always the possibility of taking the Lester case
to its ultimate extreme by projecting the amount of child support to be
paid over the minority of each of the children, adding to it the
amount of alimony to be paid to the wife, and lumping all of it into
a lump sum settlement payable over a period of more than ten years.
While so far as it is known there is no tax case which has had occasion
to examine such a provision, this arrangement would be unobjection-
able and would safely produce alimony deductions for husband down
the line as to the entire sums payable, both before and after the
wife's remarriage. Caution in drafting is required, however, to handle
the apparent general prohibition against either parent foreclosing
the rights of children to support payments. Hence, it would be
strongly advisable to insert a form of indemnity agreement whereby
the wife binds herself to reimburse her husband for any additional
sums paid by him under future court orders increasing or establishing
separate support payments in behalf of the children.
35. DuCanto, Tax Benefits of Paying Lump Sum Alimony Settlements in
Installments, 51 CGi. B. REC. 36 (1969).
36. Supra note 34.
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, Care in drafting of a Lester-type agreement. is, of course, of para-
mount importance, particularly where the attorney is departing from
the more simple formulations as in the first two examples herein
set forth. There is always present the danger of inadvertently "fix-
ing" a sum certain when nothing of the sort was originally intended
by either party.37 Then, too, there is always the unexpected, strange
twist of facts and fate, which eludes consideration by even the most
compulsive and careful of draftsmen, such as found in the Siegert
case38, which held that a second court, acting under the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, "fixed" child support even
though the original court of initial jurisdiction did not do so.
CONCLUSION AS TO THE Lester CASE
In concluding this exposition respecting the Lester case, I would
like to leave with several firm thoughts to be carried by the attorney
as he handles matrimonial matters and the inevitable drafting job
which goes with them.
First, the Lester rule is now well-spelled out and is clearly recog-
nized by the Internal Revenue Service and its agents. Thus there is
no risk involved in following the mandate of the Lester case precisely.
Second, be chary when attempting to expand or elaborate upon the
Lester rule. Curb the natural desire to be creative or to try to make
a good thing even better, unless you are absolutely clear in what you
are doing and what ensuing tax results will be achieved. Third,
carry knowledge of the Lester rule into the formulation of "tem-
porary" or pendente lite orders. Remember, temporary orders often
have a way of becoming permanent ones despite best efforts to the
contrary. Fourth, the Lester case can assist materially by injecting
certainty of results into the lives of both litigants. A well-drafted
Lester-type provision will spell out how much income the mother
will have available to her after occurrence of easily anticipated
events-her remarriage and successive emancipation of the chil-
dren. The reciprocal of the above is, of course, also true with
respect to the father. Finally, use Lester in those cases with limited
income to be divided. While the figures might not be nearly as dra-
37 Commissioner v. Gotthelf, 407 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1969).
38. Ines Siegert, 51 T.C.M. 611 (1969).
1970]
736 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIX:717
matic as those I have herein quoted, the tax saving involved is even
more important where the economic resources are limited and where
whatever is saved in taxes may well be employed in providing
the necessities of life rather than economic frills which upgrade the
quality of life but which could, nonetheless, be jettisoned without
serious concern by anyone.
